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Abstract
Economic growth is often in conflict with environmental goals. Biodiversity
offsetting attempts to resolve this conflict by requiring industries to compen-
sate for the biodiversity loss they cause, by generating an equivalent biodiver-
sity gain elsewhere. Offsets for environmental impacts are increasingly being
seen as a way to help meet preexisting conservation targets, such as those
relating to the establishment and management of protected areas. We exam-
ine how using offsets to meet a state or organization’s genuine commitments,
which are not contingent on the offsets, results in no additional conservation
benefit. In this case, either the offset or the preexisting commitment is invalid.
For example, the use of offsets to meet commitments under the Convention on
Biological Diversity requires an admission that those commitments would oth-
erwise not be met. This interaction between international agreements around
protected areas and offset policy can generate perverse incentives, which must
be carefully managed to avoid poor conservation outcomes. We propose sepa-
rate accounting for conservation gains generated using offsets, and that future
conservation agreements and targets should explicitly separate commitments
met using offset gains from those which are not reliant on equivalent losses.
Introduction
Biodiversity offsets involve compensating for biodiversity
loss in one location by generating an equivalent biodi-
versity gain elsewhere. The concept has been rapidly and
widely adopted with at least 37 nations now having for-
mal policies specifically requiring or enabling the use of
offsets Pilgrim & Bennun 2014), along with regulations in
many provincial and local government jurisdictions. Ma-
jor players in several industries have also embraced vol-
untary offsetting as a way to build their social license to
operate (Rainey et al. 2015).
Increasingly, the introduction of biodiversity offsets to
the environmental policy space is raising challenging is-
sues. A key debate concerns the validity of using offsets
to help achieve national targets to which nations have
committed under the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CDB; Pilgrim & Bennun 2014; Githiru et al. 2015; Maron
et al. 2015b). The focus of debate thus far has been tar-
gets relating to the extent and management effectiveness
of protected areas (Aichi Target 11), but the central is-
sue extends to others, such as the restoration of 15% of
degraded lands (Aichi Target 15).
For the purposes of this discussion, we focus on Aichi
Target 11. This requires the CBD’s 196 parties to, by
2020, effectively conserve 17% of terrestrial and 10%
of marine realms in areas that are “important” for biodi-
versity, ecologically representative and connected (CBD
2011). While the national-level percentage targets for
areal extent of protected areas vary, and some countries
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have met or exceeded their area target, the element of
Aichi Target 11 requiring that those protected areas be
“effectively managed” remains a challenge for many
countries (Watson et al. 2014, 2015; Butchart et al.
2015).
Offsets that create new protected areas, fund the man-
agement of existing protected areas and restore de-
graded ecosystems are already occurring in many parts
of the world (Brownlie and Botha 2009; McKenney and
Kiesecker 2010; Bos et al. 2014; Villarroya et al. 2014).
Proponents of the use of offsets as a funding mechanism
for achieving such protected area targets point to the
slow progress of many nations toward meeting the targets
(Watson et al. 2014) and the widespread inadequacy of
funding for protected area management (McCarthy et al.
2012; Githiru et al. 2015; Kiesecker et al. 2015). Critics
emphasize the risk of cost-shifting: using offsets to replace
expenditure toward already-agreed targets, thus failing
the requirement that offset gains are additional, and re-
sulting in net biodiversity loss (Pilgrim and Bennun 2014;
Gordon et al. 2015).
The issue of how offset validity is affected by existing
commitments around protected areas has to date been
only briefly touched upon in offset guidelines (e.g. IUCN
2014). However, offsets are increasingly being applied
to fund the creation or management of protected areas
without agreement on how they can, or should, validly
be used (IUCN 2014; Pilgrim and Bennun 2014). In a
recent publication (Maron et al. 2015b), we contended
that biodiversity offsets can contribute to boosting
protected area coverage and management, but that
because of the requirement that offsets generate benefits
additional to those that would otherwise have occurred,
the use of offsets to meet preexisting commitments is
valid only if there is no intention otherwise to meet
those commitments. In this Policy Perspective, we extend
this argument, and explain the ways in which offsets
differ from other forms of conservation finance. We
then describe several responses to reduce the risk of
perverse outcomes from the interaction between existing
commitments and offsets.
We constrain our discussion to “no net loss” biodi-
versity offsets. No net loss as an offset goal requires
that the biota targeted by the offset exchange—such
as particular species or ecosystems—is not diminished
in net terms compared to what would have occurred
without the impact and the offset (Maron et al. 2013).
Alternative goals for biodiversity offset outcomes exist
(Brownlie and Botha 2009), but best practice offsets are
widely considered to require achievement of at least no
net loss (ten Kate et al. 2004; IUCN 2014). The goal of
“net gain” or “net positive impact” is also commonly
cited in policy (McKenney and Kiesecker 2010) and our
arguments apply equally to this approach. If an offset
is intended to achieve a net gain, but that gain would
otherwise have occurred without the offset because
of prior commitments, then the key requirement of
additionality has not been met.
Offsets are a unique form of
conservation finance
The conceptual basis of offsets sets them apart from other
types of conservation tools in ways that are not intuitive
(Bull et al. 2013). They are not the standard conservation
activity where the foremost objective is to maximize ben-
efits for biodiversity, nor are they a “payment for ecosys-
tem services” (PES) scheme, which provides payments
to landowners to avoid certain land uses such as logging
or converting natural ecosystems to intensive land uses.
Rather, they involve counterbalancing the loss of a spe-
cific amount and type of biodiversity, the residual impact
after appropriate avoidance, minimization and on-site re-
habilitation measures have been taken. As such, some ar-
gue it is an example of a “strong sustainability” approach
(Que´tier et al. 2014).
Biodiversity offsets therefore have the unique fea-
ture that resulting conservation gains are directly tied
to equivalent losses, which has two important conse-
quences. First, the conservation outcome of a soundly-
executed “no net loss” offset exchange is, by design,
neutral at best and cannot be construed as a conservation
gain (Gordon et al. 2015). Second, if a “no net loss” offset
action falls short of expected conservation benefits, then
the net result of the impact and the offset is always a loss
of biodiversity. This is in contrast to other conservation
activities, where a shortfall in conservation benefit does
not imply a direct loss, but merely an unrealized benefit.
Other sources of conservation finance, such as taxes
and levies, are collected without any claim that they will
achieve a specific and attributable net outcome. Taxing
industries that damage the environment and using that
money to pay for conservation actions is a reasonable
way to move the cost burden away from the public (Hard-
ner et al. 2015), consistent with the “polluter pays” princi-
ple. However, in this case the payment of the tax does not
enable claims about specific impacts being offset. Offsets,
in contrast, are designed to achieve a specific net out-
come, so the expectations set by claiming an offset has
been done differ fundamentally. By conducting a fair, ro-
bust offset, a company (for example) is purchasing the
right to claim that they are responsible for no net envi-
ronmental impact. Offsets are thus potentially powerful
tools for generating social license to operate. But if those
offset gains are used to acquit one debt, they become
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unavailable for acquitting another. In other words, they
cannot be double-counted.
Counterfactual scenarios
For a given biodiversity offset action to generate a gain
that can then be used to counterbalance a loss, it must
improve biodiversity outcomes compared to what would
have occurred without the offset (Maron et al. 2013).
Only biodiversity gains over and above this counterfac-
tual scenario can be considered “additional” and thus be
exchanged for biodiversity losses elsewhere. The use of
a counterfactual scenario that overestimates biodiversity
loss without the offset will overestimate the gains from
the offset, allowing a larger impact to be permitted in ex-
change for the offset. This results in net biodiversity loss
from the offset exchange (Gordon et al. 2015). Therefore,
a fair and plausible specification of the counterfactual sce-
nario must be fully consistent with genuine future inten-
tions and agreed actions. Accordingly, for offset gains to
be additional, by definition they must be a deviation from
those future intentions. In other words, offset actions do
not result in true gains if those actions were already in-
tended (Maron et al. 2013).
National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plans (NBSAPs)
are core to the implementation of the CBD’s Strategic
Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, thus forming “ . . . the
principal instruments for implementing the [CBD] at national
level” (https://www.cbd.int/nbsap/default.shtml). The
NBSAPs submitted by party nations to the CBD secre-
tariat include national targets mapped against the Aichi
Targets, including Target 11. These commitments are
presented as genuine intentions, not merely aspirational
goals, and are described by the CBD Secretariat as:
“reflect[ing] how the country intends to fulfil the objectives
of the Convention in light of specific national circumstances”
(https://www.cbd.int/nbsap/introduction.shtml). The
commitments are conditional for developing countries
on the provision of adequate support (including financial
support) from developed countries. Commitments for
meeting Target 11, however, are not conditional on
offsets generated from equivalent biodiversity losses.
We cannot have it both ways
Establishment of new protected areas can validly be used
as an offset, as can financing management of existing pro-
tected areas. However, any offset benefit is an admission
of what was not otherwise intended. If offset activities
involve actions that were already planned and not con-
tingent on the offset, then those activities do not result
in additional gains and therefore cannot be used to offset
losses. It follows that using offsets to reach a preexisting
conservation target means that either there was no in-
tention to reach the target or that the offsets are not valid
(Maron et al. 2015b).
In the case of an offset funding a new protected area,
the key question is: would this percentage increase in
the national protected area estate have been otherwise
achieved? Similarly, if the offset involves funding con-
servation management of an existing protected area, the
question becomes: would this management have other-
wise occurred? If the answer to these questions is no,
then the offset is valid—but it reveals that these actions
were not otherwise intended. If, on the other hand, the
answer is yes, then the validity of the offset is called into
question. This is perhaps more self-evident in the case of
offsets that provide funding for protected area manage-
ment than it is in the case of an offset site becoming a new
protected area and considered to contribute to achieve-
ment of Aichi Target 11. Essentially, offsets used to gen-
erate new protected areas can be considered a form of
leakage: even though that particular site may not oth-
erwise have become protected without the offset, it
means that another site that would have been protected
to achieve the CBD target, may no longer be protected.
Where an offset exchange results in a new or better-
managed protected area, there are four possible outcomes
(Figure 1). If the offset benefits are accounted for sepa-
rately to progress toward existing commitments, then the
offset remains valid and the integrity of efforts to meet
the commitments is maintained. However, if use of the
offset benefits to achieve existing commitments is sought,
then either the commitment is honored, in which case
the offset is not valid (because it does not produce addi-
tional conservation benefits), or it is not honored, open-
ing up the potential for the offset to remain valid, but
representing a withdrawal from the preexisting commit-
ment to meet a target. Such an outcome may be con-
sidered valid if the original commitment is no longer (or
never was) realistic given in-country circumstances, or
not valid, for example, where a wealthy country with the
means to meet their commitments seeks to cost-shift by
double-counting offsets.
Perverse outcomes from policy
interactions
There is potential for perverse outcomes from osten-
sibly beneficial conservation actions due to the inter-
action of international agreements around protected
areas with the rapid adoption of offset policies. We
focus here on two of the most concerning: manipulation
of counterfactual scenarios; and cost-shifting. Both risks
can be moderated, although not eliminated.
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Protected area oﬀsets addional 
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YES NO 
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circumstances? 
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YES NO 
Developing countries with inadequate 
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intenons & naonal 
targets 
Figure 1 Decision treeoutliningpotential consequencesof usingoffset funding to fund thepurchase and/ormanagement of protected areas for countries
with commitments to preexisting protected area targets.
First, since benefits of a given action are measured rel-
ative to a counterfactual, there is an incentive for that
counterfactual to be manipulated. A pessimistic counter-
factual scenario, for example, means a particular offset
action would be considered to generate a greater amount
of biodiversity gain, which can in turn can be exchanged
for a greater amount of loss (Gordon et al. 2015). There-
fore, if governments have an interest in keeping the cost
of offsets low, they may experience an incentive to invest
less in other conservation actions that would improve
the counterfactual scenario for biodiversity (Gordon et al.
2015). As a result, recognition that genuine offsets re-
quire a deviation from existing commitments may in fact
incentivize withdrawal from such existing commitments,
unless disincentives for withdrawal—such as reputational
risks or fines—are strong.
Second, where the counterfactual scenario is not ex-
plicitly stated, there is a risk that benefits generated by
offsets will be used in place of government investment
that was either previously intended, or that would have
been forthcoming had the alternative resourcing through
offsets not become available (Pilgrim and Bennun 2014;
Githiru et al. 2015; Gordon et al. 2015). The risk of such
crowding out may be particularly strong where offsets are
delivered through third parties and/or funds for their im-
plementation are pooled with those from other sources,
making separation of genuine gains from ‘neutral’ no net
loss outcomes from offsets challenging. If offsets can fund
the apparent achievement of the environmental goals of
a government, the incentive to invest central revenue in
environmental outcomes is likely to be reduced (see dis-
cussion in Gordon et al. 2015).
The design of REDD+ schemes for carbon offsets has
also needed to generate rules that make counterfactual
scenarios robust to gaming (Venter et al. 2010). Responses
have included the use of set national-level counterfactual
scenarios of deforestation drawn largely from recent
deforestation rates. While this reduces opportunity for
counterfactual manipulation, it has been criticized as
unrealistic and insensitive to likely future changes in
deforestation rate (Angelsen 2008). Developing coun-
terfactuals consistent with plausible futures remains a
significant challenge (Sloan & Pelletier 2012) but it is an
exercise critical to the success of offsets of all types.
The potential for gaming of counterfactuals in biodi-
versity offsetting is compounded by the fact that rarely
is a higher-level reference scenario clearly and quanti-
tatively articulated, and assessments of offset addition-
ality are often made on a case-by-case basis. However,
regional-scale cumulative impact assessments and strate-
gic impact assessments increasingly are required where
multiple developments are envisaged (Short et al. 2013).
We propose that counterfactual scenarios, consistent with
intended conservation actions as well as anticipated im-
pacts for which no offsets are required, be developed at
the same time, to facilitate decisions about offsets.
A core requirement for any counterfactual scenario is
its consistency with other stated and genuinely intended
future plans—excluding both the offsets themselves and,
importantly, any actions which themselves would trigger
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offset requirements. Greater transparency around coun-
terfactual assumptions used for calculating offset bene-
fit would therefore allow explicit comparison with the
stated intentions of, for example, responsible govern-
ments (Gordon et al. 2015; Maron et al. 2015a). Should
inconsistencies be revealed, the integrity of the offset re-
quires them to be resolved, one way or another.
Transparent accounting: A way forward
In many contexts, the most effective offsets will involve
the generation and management of protected areas. No
net loss policies, offsetting and other commitments such
as those under the CBD can all work in synergy to
achieve good conservation outcomes. For example, a hy-
brid scheme whereby developers must offset certain spe-
cific impacts but also pay a biodiversity tax, the use of
which is more flexible, is one possible approach. But be-
cause of the differences we have outlined between offsets
and other forms of conservation finance, the reporting
and accounting of benefits from offsets must be managed
carefully to minimize perverse outcomes. In our recent
publication (Maron et al. 2015b), we proposed two re-
sponses, which we elaborate upon here. First, benefits
generated by offsets should always be reported alongside
the losses that triggered them, and not promoted in isola-
tion. Second, accounting of benefits generated by offsets
should be separated from those generated through other
mechanisms. The interaction between several of the Aichi
Targets and biodiversity offsets is opaque. As future com-
mitments beyond 2020 are negotiated, we argue that ex-
plicit negotiation to determine acceptable use of offsets
for achieving future targets is important, not least from
the perspective of fairness. Clearly, the value of meeting
a conservation target only by allowing equivalent losses
is different from that of meeting the same target without
those losses, and this should be recognized.
We propose that requiring the parallel reporting of
counterfactual assumptions from which offset gains are
to be measured alongside every offset may act as a check
on undesirable behavior. This would make clear what
was intended were the offset not to occur, allow cross-
checking to ensure consistency with other relevant plans
and commitments, and assist in monitoring the validity
of each offset. Such an approach is consistent with those
used in REDD+ whereby the counterfactual “reference”
scenario of “what would occur” to forests without inter-
vention is explicitly specified (Venter and Koh 2012).
Importantly, we recognize the reality that there are
many nations that will continue to struggle to achieve
their protected area commitments (Pilgrim and Bennun
2014; Watson et al. 2014). Such nations are often those
where offsets are likely to be particularly important, as
economically poor governments may not have the op-
tion to fund beneficial environmental actions. Pilgrim and
Bennun (2014) propose the approach of “temporary ad-
ditionality,” whereby less-developed nations may validly
use offsets to fund more rapid progress toward their pro-
tected area commitments. However, it remains the case
that for such actions to constitute genuine offsets, those
governments must still openly admit that some of those
new protected areas would not have been gazetted with-
out the offset—an admission that, we argue, may some-
times be judged reasonable, such as where assistance
from the global community has been inadequate (Fig-
ure 1). Importantly, for such judgements to be made by
the international community, honest acknowledgement
of the lack of intention to meet targets without offsets is
required.
Governments often fail to meet targets set under in-
ternational agreements. But they benefit, at least repu-
tationally, from the appearance that they intend to meet
their commitments. We argue that if this appearance is at
odds with genuine intentions, then nothing is gained by
merely keeping up appearances. Governments may pre-
fer to use strategies such as ‘blame avoidance’ for pol-
icy failure, rather than directly address conflicts between
policy objectives, thus avoiding domestic and interna-
tional pressure and stymying progress toward environ-
mental goals (Ongolo and Karsenty 2015). Demanding
transparency about intentions is crucial to a clear under-
standing of the adequacy of conservation targets, and also
has important implications for perceived fairness, which
is critical to ensuring initial agreement and ongoing com-
pliance with international agreements.
Conclusion
As offsets increase in popularity with governments and
developers globally, they are already being used to create
new protected areas, manage those areas, and fund
government-run conservation programs. Offsets are an
increasingly significant source of conservation funding
in some biodiverse developing countries (Quintero and
Mathur 2011). Judgements by the international commu-
nity about the validity of such actions will therefore have
far-reaching consequences for the future of biodiversity
globally.
We suggest that the conceptual basis of offsets—
explicitly linking each unit of biodiversity loss to at least
an equivalent gain—is essential to turning the tide of
extinction and biodiversity decline. However, without
a genuine balance sheet showing not just conservation
wins, such as new protected areas, but the losses too
(McDonald-Madden et al. 2009), we risk entrenching bio-
diversity losses while at the same time celebrating what
we think are gains.
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